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A Bayesian Examination of Information and Uncertainty in
Contingent Valuation

Abstract. A theoretical framework is presented to explain how agents respond to information
under uncertainty in contingent valuation surveys. Agents are provided with information signals
and referendum prices as part of the elicitation process. Agents use Bayesian updating to revise
prior distributions. An information prompt is presented to reduce hypothetical bias. However,
we show the interaction between anchoring and the information prompt creates a systematic bias
in willingness to pay. We test our hypotheses in an experimental setting where agents are asked to
make a hypothetical, voluntary contribution to a public good. Experimental results are consistent
with the model.
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A person’s willingness to pay (WTP) for a good or service is often unknown before the consumer
participates in a market or contributes to the provision of a public good.

Frequently, potential

consumers are surveyed about their WTP before making payment or even before the good exists.
These surveys are conducted using written, oral or visual descriptions, often quite vague, of goods
not yet fully developed. Under such circumstances, WTP is elicited in an environment of uncertainty causing agents to search for signals during the survey process that will help them arrive at
an improved WTP estimate.

Our goal in this paper is to provide a theoretical foundation that

describes how agents react to various types of information about the good during the value elicitation process. It is natural to treat this reaction process as a Bayesian-updating problem, since
agents are being provided with new information for which they can revise their WTP.1
Our focus is on the contingent valuation (CV) survey method, which uses hypothetical responses
to estimate consumers’ WTP.2 A central problem with surveys like the CV method of elicitation
is that agents are not in real market environments; stated values are prone to hypothetical bias.3
Agents often knowingly or unknowingly misrepresent their true preferences for the good in a hypothetical settings.

True preferences are revealed in actual markets or when it comes time to

contribute to the provision of a public good. In response, researchers have proposed remedies such
as combining revealed and stated preference data (Adamowicz, Louviere and Williams (1994)),
calibrating hypothetical responses to actual choices (Johannesson, Blomquist, Blumenschein, Johansson, Liljas and O’Conor (1999)), and providing explicit information prompts or signals prior
to the WTP questions with the hope that respondents will self correct with the new information.
1

Bayesian updating has been used to describe decision making under uncertainty in a variety of economic contexts
such as learning about workplace risk (Viscusi and O’Connor (1984)), herding behavior and information cascades
(Anderson and Holt (1997)), and global climate change (Cameron (2005)).
2
This method has been a popular method for eliciting the value of non-market goods. For an overview of this
literature see Brookshire, Thayer, Schulze and D’Arge (1982), Hausman (1993), Mitchell and Carson (1989), and
Cummings, Brookshire and Schulze (1986).
3
See Murphy, Allen, Stevens and Weatherhead (forthcoming) for a review of the hypothetical bias literature in
contingent valuation.
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The information is not limited to, but might inform agents about budget constraints, substitute
goods, or the extent to which preferences have been misrepresented in previous surveys.
Much of this information is referred to as “cheap talk” (Cummings and Taylor (1999)), a term
with origins in the game theory literature. Gibbons (1992, p.210) refers to cheap talk as “costless,
nonbinding, nonverifiable claims.” They are signals that have no credibility. In survey contexts,
agents may treat cheap talk as completely non-informative and ignore it, while in other contexts
it may be considered partially informative.

Our theory treats cheap talk in CV studies as a

partially informative signal sent to respondents — one that agents will act on and use to update the
uncertain value they place on the good. Henceforth, we will refer to the information given prior
to the elicitation of WTP in CV surveys as cheap talk.
We apply our theory to a referendum CV study where agents are first given cheap talk and
then provided a single referendum price.4 Agents are prone to have a bias while formulating their
WTP. The bias is modeled as a stochastic component of utility (and thus WTP) over which agents
form priors. Priors are updated in a Bayesian manner as agents are provided with cheap talk and
an opening price for the non-market, public good.5

The agent then forms a rational, updated

estimate of the distribution of his or her stochastic bias term and uses this estimate to calibrate a
WTP response. By modeling the agent’s problem this way, we make transparent the process by
which signals are used to resolve uncertainty regarding the value of the good.
In our model, agents rationally anchor their WTP estimates to an announced price in a manner
that depends on whether or not they received cheap talk. This dependence is important because
the eﬀectiveness of cheap talk in reducing hypothetical bias is usually tested by comparing the
4

We later extend our theory to address the double-bounded dichotomous choice (DBDC) format, where the issue
of incentive incompatibility is discussed.
5
Herriges and Shogren (1996) and McLeod and Bergland (1999) use a Bayesian approach to examine the issues of
anchoring bias (where agents are induced by the question format itself to anchor their responses to an opening referendum price) and incentive incompatibility (where agents are induced by the question format to provide untruthful
responses) in CV surveys. Unlike their studies, however, we aim to provide a more formal and general theory of the
origins of hypothetical bias and the Bayesian updating process during the value elicitation process.
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actions of those receiving cheap talk (the treatment group) with those who do not (the control
group). Consequently, diﬀerences between the treatment and control groups that are attributed
solely to cheap talk may instead reflect diﬀerences in how agents anchor their WTP estimates to
announced prices. And unlike other studies that have estimated anchoring eﬀects in CV (Chanel,
Aprahamian and Luchini (forthcoming); Whitehead (2002)), our specification allows us to econometrically identify the anchoring eﬀect without need for a follow-up price.
We propose an experimental design for a hypothetical public good and run a series of treatments
that separate the eﬀect of cheap talk from anchoring.

Our experimental design distinguishes

the eﬀects of anchoring and cheap talk in the valuation of a generic public good by mimicking
the way CV surveys are typically implemented in practice, that is, subjects receive diﬀerent price
announcements presented as take-it-or-leave-it choices. By dividing our sample into two treatments
involving a hypothetical contribution toward a public good — one without cheap talk and one with
cheap talk — we are able to measure the extent to which anchoring and cheap talk interact in the
context of a Bayesian updating process.
Our principal finding is that the interaction between anchoring and cheap talk manifests itself
as an upward bias in the observed cheap talk eﬀect when the announced price is relatively high,
and as a downward bias when the announced prices is relatively low.

This result is consistent

with several recent empirical papers on the subject and provides one explanation for the conflicting
empirical results associated with hypothetical bias and cheap talk in the CV literature.6
6
The empirical evidence is mixed on whether cheap talk is, in general, an eﬀective means of eliminating hypothetical
bias in CV and field experiments. Cummings and Taylor (1999) find that a long cheap-talk script is eﬀective in
eliminating hypothetical bias. List (2001) and Lusk (2003) use a script similar to that of Cummings and Taylor
and find that cheap talk only works for inexperienced consumers. Poe, Clark, Rondeau and Schulze (2002) report
that a shorter cheap-talk script is ineﬀective in eliminating hypothetical bias; Loomis, Gonzalez-Caban and Gregory
(1994) and Neil (1995) find that reminders about budget constraints and substitutes also are ineﬀective. Aadland
and Caplan (2003) find that, although cheap talk is ineﬀective overall, it successfully reduces hypothetical bias for
certain groups of respondents. However in other work, Cummings, Harrison and Taylor (1995) and Aadland and
Caplan (2006) use a shorter script and find that cheap talk may even exacerbate the hypothetical bias. We oﬀer
a theory that is independent of script length and has the potential to explain some of the results that script length
cannot. We note, however, that it would be fairly straightforward to incorporate a script-length eﬀect into our
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1

Theoretical Framework

Assume a continuum of agents indexed on the unit interval.

Representative agent i ∈ (0, 1)

maximizes utility
ui = u(zi , G(ηi ); θi )

(1)

by choosing a vector of private goods, zi . Each agent’s valuation of the public good, G, depends
on a stochastic component ηi (discussed below). θi is a vector of individual-specific characteristics
excluding income level. The agent’s budget constraint is

mi ≥ p0 zi + gi

(2)

where mi is income, p is a vector of prices corresponding to z, and gi ≥ 0 is an exogenously
determined lump-sum payment toward the provision of G. We assume that the sum of the total
private contributions,

R

i gi di,

results in provision of the public good at level G.

We invoke the standard assumption that utility is strictly increasing and quasi-concave in both
the private and public goods. The term ηi reflects the notion that agents are not always capable
of accurately assessing the value of the public good due to a lack of experience with the good or
potential bias in a hypothetical setting.

In particular, agents with ηi > 0 tend to overestimate

their WTP for G, agents with ηi < 0 tend to underestimate their WTP for G, while agents with
ηi = 0 accurately assess their WTP for G. As we show below, although agents attempt to correct
for the bias via their interactions with the interviewer in a hypothetical assessment, they do not
necessarily have adequate information to completely eliminate it.
As is common in the literature, we refer to hypothetical bias as the tendency to misstate true
WTP when in a hypothetical rather than a real market environment. This definition is suﬃciently
Bayesian framework whereby long scripts evoke a larger WTP revision than short scripts.
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broad to accommodate many of the diﬀerent biases associated with nonmarket valuation, such as
strategic bias, awareness bias, nay-saying, yeah-saying, etc. In particular, our theory assumes that
hypothetical bias is stochastic and involves a respondent continually updating and estimating the
degree of personal bias using a Bayesian approach.

In our view, this is the most natural way

to think about hypothetical bias but note that it could instead result deterministically, e.g., as a
“purchase of moral satisfaction” (Kahneman and Knetsch (1992)) or as a desire to conform socially
(Bernheim (1994)).

In these cases, one might think of cheap talk as an updating mechanism

that instills guilt in the respondent (for knowingly reporting an untruthful WTP) rather than a
mechanism that reduces uncertainty.
Let zi∗ = z(p, mi − gi , G(ηi ); θi ) represent the agent’s optimal choice of the private good vector,
implying indirect utility level u∗i = u(zi∗ , G(ηi ); θi ).

The corresponding minimum expenditure

function, defined with respect to net income, mi − gi , is

ei = e(p, G(ηi ), u∗i ; θi ) = mi − gi .

(3)

Using (3), the agent’s WTP for G is derived as

W T Pi = e(p, G = 0, u∗i ; θi ) − e(p, G(ηi ), u∗i ; θi ),

(4)

which is the diﬀerence between the minimum expenditure required to achieve utility level u∗i without
and with the public good. Due to the presence of ηi , (4) reflects the agent’s perceived, rather than
true, WTP for the public good. Accordingly, we characterize perceived W T Pi as:

W T Pi = W T Pi (ηi = 0) + δi ,
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(5)

where W T Pi (ηi = 0) is “true” WTP and δi is a random variable with density function p(δi ) and
population mean
μ=

Z

δi p(δi )dδi .

(6)

We assume that δi reflects the agent’s innate tendency to incorrectly estimate WTP for the public
good.

While agents do not know p(δi ), they do hold prior beliefs regarding the distribution for

δi . Based on this subjective probability distribution for δi , they form a corresponding expectation
denoted by Ei (δi ). This expectation represents the agent’s initial evaluation of personal bias. For
example, if δi > Ei (δi ) = 0, then the agent does not recognize that he is overvaluing the public
good and thus a positive bias exists. Another possibility is that δi > Ei (δi ) > 0, in which case the
agent suspects that he is overvaluing the public good, but only partially corrects for the bias.
We refer to the agent’s initial perceived WTP as W T Pi0 , which is given by (5). However, as the
agent receives information (assumed from the interviewer), the agent revises W T Pi in an attempt
to reduce the influence of δi and bring perceived WTP closer to the true WTP. The agent thus
forms
W T Pi1 = Ei (W T Pi |si ) = W T Pi0 − Ei (δi |si ),

(7)

where Ei (W T Pi |si ) is agent i’s expectation of W T Pi conditional upon the information contained
in the signal vector si .

From (5) and (7), we see that clear signals provided by the interviewer

regarding the population mean of δi are, on average, likely to bring perceived WTP closer to the
true WTP.

1.1

Bayesian Updating

Each agent faces a Bayesian-updating problem with a subjective prior distribution for δi , hi (δi ).
Henceforth, we assume Ei (δi ) = 0 so that the agent initially perceives no bias in valuing the public

8

good.

After receiving the signal si from the interviewer, the agent then uses Bayes’ formula to

form the posterior distribution for δi :

ki (δi |si ) ∝ gi (si |δi )hi (δi ),

where gi (si |δi ) is the distribution for si conditional on δi .

(8)

The function gi (si |δi ) captures the

essence of the revisions to beliefs about δi by directly accounting for the interaction between δi and
si . Assuming a quadratic loss function, the agent then responds “rationally” to si by forming an
updated expectation of δi using7

Ei (δi |si ) =

2

Z

δi ki (δi |si )dδi .

(9)

Application to a Referendum CV Survey

To elicit W T Pi for a public good in a referendum CV format, the interviewer presents the agent
with a hypothetical price for the public good, τi .8

The agent then compares W T Pi1 to τi , and

hypothetically buys into the public good if W T Pi1 > τi and declines otherwise.

The point of

reference is W T Pi1 because prior to oﬀering the price τi , the interviewer presents the agent with a
signal, represented as a draw ci ∈ {0, μ}. A draw of ci = 0 represents no additional information,
while a draw of ci = μ > 0 informs the agent of δi ’s population mean.9
7

See Hogg and Craig (1978) for a discussion of Bayesian estimation.
Throughout the paper, we refer to τi as the “announced price”. In the contingent valuation literature, it is
common to refer to τi as the “referendum bid” or “bid”. We avoid using the term bid in this paper so as not to
create any confusion associated with its use in other areas of economics such as auction theory. In the experiment
described below subjects are presented with “investment” levels in the public good.
9
In practice, not all cheap-talk scripts directly inform agents of the magnitude of the hypothetical bias. Instead
they often report diﬀerences in actual and hypothetical participation rates for public programs or goods (e.g., Cummings and Taylor (1999); Lusk (2003)), percentage diﬀerence in stated and revealed WTP (e.g., List (2001)), or
make a general statement that WTP tends to be misstated in hypothetical scenarios (e.g., Carlsson, Frykblom and
Lagerkvist (2005) and Aadland and Caplan (2006)). It would be fairly straightforward to modify our theory so that,
rather than being directly informed of μ and knowing it with certainty, the agent received an indirect signal about μ
and was required to infer its value.
8

9

Based on ci , we therefore have two scenarios to consider.

2.1

No Hypothetical-Bias Signal

We begin by considering the case where the agent receives the signal s0i = {ci = 0, τi }. Because
no signal is sent prior to the price τi , revisions to δi are exclusively due to information contained
in τi . For this scenario, we assume

Ei (δi |s0i ) = α(W T Pi0 − τi )

where 0 < α < 1.

(10)

Equation (10) states that in revising the bias estimate, the agent considers

the bias to be a fraction of the diﬀerence between the initial WTP estimate and the announced
price. Implicit in (10) is the fact that the agent perceives τi as a signal that the interviewer has
private information regarding the true WTP distribution. Substituting (10) into (7), we obtain an
updated WTP (W T Pi1 ) via the function

W T Pi1 = (1 − α)W T Pi0 + ατi .

(11)

This updating function is equivalent to the one presented in Herriges and Shogren (1996).10
There is strong evidence to support the notion of anchoring, beginning with the seminal work
of Kahneman and Tversky.11

Tversky and Kahneman (1974) describe anchoring as a heuristic

where “people make estimates by starting from an initial value that is adjusted to yield the final answer.” They famously illustrate the anchoring phenomenon by asking subjects to estimate
10
The weighted-average form of the updating function in (11) results if gi (si |δi ) is a normal distribution and
α = σh2 /(σg2 + σh2 ), where σg2 is the variance of gi (si |δi ) and σh2 is the variance of the prior distribution hi (δi ). The
formal derivation of (11) is shown in Appendix A.
11
See Laibson and Zeckhauser (1998) for a discussion that relates Kahneman and Tversky’s work to the burgeoning
field of “behavioral economics”.
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various quantities (stated in percentages), such as the number of African countries in the United
Nations.

The final percentage estimates were inexplicably correlated to the arbitrary numbers

provided by the spinning of a wheel of fortune. Anchoring has been reported in a myriad of other
contexts: Armantier (2006) across consecutive surveys relating to subjective estimates of lethal
risks; Hurd (1999) in surveys that use brackets to elicit household assets; and McFadden (2001) in
CV referendum surveys. McFadden (2001, p. 364) explains the presence of anchoring by stating
that...
A psychological explanation for anchoring is that a prompt creates in the subject’s
mind, at least temporarily, the possibility that the uncertain quantity could be either
above or below the prompt...Education trains individuals to use problem-solving protocols in which responses to questions are based not only on substantive knowledge,
but also on contextual cues as to what a correct response might be. Consequently, it
is no surprise if subjects apply these protocols and use numerical prompts in forming
responses.
To clarify the eﬀects of anchoring in our context, consider the following.

Suppose the agent

begins with an initial perceived valuation of the public good, W T Pi0 , which is based on a noninformative prior and initial expectation of bias Ei (δi ) = 0. The agent is then confronted with an
announced price such that τi > W T Pi0 .

This price anchors perceptions.

The agent interprets

this information as indicating that the true WTP value is likely to be somewhere between W T Pi0
and τi . As a result, the agent now places a larger probability on outcomes where δi < 0 and infers
that the perceived distribution for δi needs to be shifted to the left. This implies that the agent
revises the perceived WTP upward toward τi , resulting in W T Pi1 > W T Pi0 .

Conversely, when

τi < W T Pi0 , the agent assumes it is now more probable that δi > 0 and that the initial WTP was
biased upward. In this case, the agent revises the perceived WTP downward toward τi , resulting
11

in W T Pi1 < W T Pi0 . Finally, when s0i does not reveal any new information (i.e., when ci = 0 and
τi = W T Pi0 ), the agent does not revise the initial expectations and sets W T Pi1 = W T Pi0 .

2.2

A Signal About The Mean of Hypothetical Bias

Next, consider the case where the agent receives the sequential signal s1i = {ci = μ, τi }. In other
words, prior to receiving the announced price the agent receives the signal that δi has population
mean μ. This does not imply that the agent now knows δi with certainty, only that it is drawn
from a distribution with mean μ.
We assume that in response to the initial signal ci = μ, the agent revises the estimate of δi so
that Ei (δi |ci = μ) = μ.12 The agent therefore estimates that his or her individual bias is equal to
the average bias in the population. Next, the agent compares the adjusted WTP (W T Pi0 − μ) to
τi and uses a variation of equation (10) to update the estimate of δi :

Ei (δi |s1i ) = μ + γ(W T Pi0 − μ − τi ),

where 0 < γ < 1. This implies

W T Pi1 = (1 − γ)(W T Pi0 − μ) + γτi .

(12)

To test whether the cheap-talk signal ci = μ is eﬀective in eliminating hypothetical bias, the
12

Some may argue that agents are unlikely to adjust their WTP perfectly to the signal ci = μ. For simplicity, we
assume perfect adjustments; however it is important to recognize that the subsequent results are robust to partial
adjustments where 0 < Ei (δi |ci = μ) < μ.

12

relevant measure is

∆i ≡ Ei (W T Pi |s1i , W T Pi0 ) − Ei (W T Pi |s0i , W T Pi0 )

(13)

= (α − γ)(W T Pi0 − τi ) + (γ − 1)μ.

If, for example, ∆i = −μ, we would conclude that cheap talk successfully reduced agent i’s WTP
bias by μ. We now discuss several diﬀerent cases that depend on the relative values of α, γ, W T Pi0 ,
and τi .

2.2.1

Case 1. Common Anchoring Structure (γ = α)

We begin with the case where γ = α, that is, the agent anchors to τi in the same fashion with or
without cheap talk. Equation (13) then collapses to ∆i = (γ − 1)μ, which implies that even when
cheap talk reduces initial WTP by exactly μ, anchoring makes it appear that cheap talk was only
partially eﬀective (i.e., ∆i > −μ).

Furthermore, as α = γ → 1, cheap talk appears to have no

eﬀect because the anchoring completely overshadows the cheap-talk adjustment.
Figure 1 depicts the interaction between cheap talk and anchoring bias for Case 1, assuming
W T Pi0 − μ > τi .

Panel A shows the prior and posterior distributions for δi when the agent

receives the signal s1i .

The agent begins with the prior distribution hi (δi ).

After receiving the

signal ci = μ, the agent then revises the distribution to ki (δi |ci = μ), leading to a revised WTP
equal to W T Pi0 − μ. Next, the agent receives the price τi and further revises the distribution to
ki (δi |ci = μ, τi ) or ki (δi |s1i ) with conditional mean W T Pi1 . In Panel B, the agent begins with the
same prior, receives price τi without having been subjected to any cheap talk, and then revises the
distribution for δi to ki (δi |ci = 0, τi ) or ki (δi |s0i ). In comparing Panels A and B, note that although
W T Pi1 is farther to the left in Panel A than in Panel B, the diﬀerence between the two is less than
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μ. As a result, when testing for cheap talk, we incorrectly conclude that cheap talk only partially
eliminates the bias μ.
To clarify, consider the following numerical example. Suppose the agent’s W T Pi0 = $10 and
the cheap-talk signal is ci = μ = $4. The agent then adjusts initial WTP to be consistent with
the first signal (i.e., W T Pi0 − μ = $6) and compares this to the announced price, which we assume
is τi = $2. Letting α = γ = 0.5, W T Pi1 = (0.5 × 6) + (0.5 × 2) = $4 with an anchoring eﬀect of
$4 − $6 = −$2. By comparison, when ci = 0 the agent sets W T Pi1 = (0.5 × 10) + (0.5 × 2) = $6,
implying an anchoring eﬀect of $6 − $10 = −$4.

Note that although cheap talk reduces initial

WTP exactly as anticipated, because of the interaction with anchoring bias, cheap talk appears to
be only partially eﬀective (i.e., ∆i = $4 − $6 = −$2 > −μ = −$4).
2.2.2

Case 2. Dual Anchoring Structures (γ 6= α)

We now consider the case where the anchoring parameter is diﬀerent with and without the cheaptalk signal. We assume throughout that γ < α so that the anchoring eﬀect associated with τi is
weakened by the presence of a cheap-talk signal. It is important to recognize that by assuming
γ < α, we are not claiming that the total eﬀect of cheap talk and anchoring on WTP is necessarily
smaller than without cheap talk, only that the marginal contribution of anchoring is weakened by
the presence of cheap talk.
Begin by defining a critical announced price

τi∗ = W T Pi0 + [γ/(α − γ)] μ,

(14)

which equates the measured cheap-talk eﬀect in (13) to −μ. As a result, for cheap talk to appear
fully eﬀective, the announced price must equal W T Pi0 plus a positive constant (μγ/(α−γ)). Figure
2 depicts the combination of W T Pi0 and τi values that will result in a measured cheap-talk eﬀect
14

equal to −μ. Using this τi∗ locus and the 45 degree line from Figure 2, we define three distinct
regions and discuss how they relate to ∆i .

Region 1.

Ineﬀective Cheap Talk (τi < W T Pi0 ). In this case, the agent receives a

relatively low announced price τi , corresponding to the region below the 45 degree line in Figure
2. When ci = 0, the agent then anchors downward toward τi .

If instead the agent receives the

cheap-talk signal ci = μ prior to receiving the price, then depending upon the size of μ, the agent
may either anchor downward toward the price (when W T Pi0 − μ > τi ), anchor upward toward the
price (when W T Pi0 − μ < τi ) or not anchor at all (when W T Pi0 − μ = τi ). Because τi < τi∗ , the
measured cheap-talk eﬀect will be larger than −μ.

In fact, we know from (13) that ∆i will be

larger than (γ − 1)μ. Therefore, we are likely to mistakenly conclude that cheap talk is ineﬀective
in eliminating the hypothetical bias, or worse yet, that it exacerbates the bias.

Region 2. Partially or Fully Eﬀective Cheap Talk (τi∗ ≥ τi ≥ W T Pi0 ). In this case, the
agent receives a price that is no less than initial WTP but no greater than the critical announced
price. This corresponds to the region in Figure 2 between (and including) the 45 degree line and
the τi∗ locus. First, if τi = W T Pi0 , anchoring only occurs for those who receive the signal si = μ.
As in Case 1, (13) simplifies to ∆i = (γ − 1)μ, implying that cheap talk appears to be only partially
eﬀective. On the other hand, if τi = τi∗ , then by (14), the measured cheap-talk eﬀect equals −μ,
and cheap talk appears to be fully eﬀective. In sum, any announced price between τi∗ and W T Pi0
leads to a measured cheap-talk eﬀect between (γ − 1)μ and −μ.
Consider another numerical example. Suppose that W T Pi0 = $10, ci = μ = $4, α = 0.5 and
γ = 0.25, implying a critical announced price from (14) of τi∗ = 14. The agent first adjusts the
initial WTP to be consistent with the cheap-talk signal (i.e., W T Pi0 − μ = $6) and then compares
this to an assumed price of τi = $12. Revised WTP is thus W T Pi1 = (0.75 × 6) + (0.25 × 12) =
15

$7.5 with an anchoring eﬀect of $7.5 − $6 = $1.5.

By comparison, when ci = 0 the agent sets

W T Pi1 = (0.5 × 10) + (0.5 × 12) = $11, implying an anchoring eﬀect of $11 − $10 = $1.

As in

Case 1, cheap talk reduces initial WTP exactly as anticipated but it appears to be only partially
eﬀective (i.e., ∆i = $7.5 − $11 = −$3.5 > −μ = −$4).
Region 3. Overly Eﬀective Cheap Talk (τi > τi∗ ). In this case, the agent receives a
relatively high announced price τi , corresponding to the area above the τi∗ locus in Figure 2. After
receiving the signal s0i , the agent anchors upward toward τi . If the agent instead receives the signal
ci = μ prior to receiving the price, the agent similarly anchors upward toward the price (note that
W T Pi0 < τi implies that W T Pi0 − μ < τi as well).
smaller (more negative) than −μ.

Because τi > τi∗ , we know that ∆i will be

We therefore conclude that although cheap talk corrects for

hypothetical bias, it does so by too much.13
Returning to our numerical example, we consider a case where τi = $18 > $14 = τi∗ . As in the
previous examples, the agent’s initial revised WTP with cheap talk is $6. Again, letting α = 0.5
and γ = 0.25, we see that with cheap talk W T Pi1 = (0.75 × 6) + (0.25 × 18) = $9, with an anchoring
eﬀect of $9 − $6 = $3. With no cheap talk, the agent’s W T Pi1 = (0.5 × 10) + (0.5 × 18) = $14,
with an anchoring eﬀect of $14 − $10 = $4. In this case, we mistakenly conclude that cheap talk
overcorrects for hypothetical bias (i.e., ∆i = $9 − $14 = −$5 < −μ = −$4).

3

Experimental Design

Here we describe a simple experimental design that distinguishes the eﬀects of anchoring and cheap
talk in the valuation of a public good.

The design shares many of the traditional features of

13

An interesting implication of this result is that samples with a substantial number of nay-sayers (i.e., low WTP
individuals (Carson (2000))) will appear to be more often associated with eﬀective cheap-talk scripts.
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public good experiments such as induced valuation and the incentive to free ride.14 Unlike many
contingent valuation studies, we do not describe an actual nonmarket good. Instead, participants
are investing in a generic public good which makes it easier to generalize our results to a wider range
of nonmarket public goods. Valuation uncertainty (δ) is brought into the design by making the
value of the public good random at each contribution level (discussed further below). The design
is intended to mimic the way CV surveys for nonmarket goods are implemented in practice. The
most common CV approach for eliciting the value of a nonmarket good is to present an individual
with a take-it-or-leave-it choice at an announced price.

The announced price is drawn from a

pre-selected distribution in order to trace out the demand curve for the nonmarket good and to
lessen the eﬀects of anchoring to a single price.

Consumers are generally comfortable with this

type of binary choice at a fixed price as it closely resembles the daily purchasing decisions made
for private goods. This binary choice environment is re-created in our experimental design, with
subjects receiving diﬀerent price announcements presented as take-it-or-leave-it choices.
We set up two treatments involving a hypothetical contribution toward a public good — one
without cheap talk (NCT treatment) and one with cheap talk (CT treatment). The entire set of
instructions and payout charts are included in Appendix B. As participants entered a classroom,
they were given $10 in cash to hypothetically “invest”, an instruction page, and a page asking
for an initial guess of their hypothetical investment decision.

The instruction page, along with

an example, were read aloud to the participants and any questions regarding the experiment were
answered.
In the example, five people could invest between $0 and $2.

Depending on their average

investment and the roll of a die, the payout chart shows all the possible returns to an investment.
After deciding an amount to invest, which could be $0, thus placing the subject in the “No, I won’t
14
For further details on public good experiments, see chapter two in the Handbook on Experimental Economics by
Ledyard (1995).
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invest” section of the chart, a die was thrown to decide if the payout was the min (1 or 2 on the
die), mid (3 or 4), or max (5 or 6). If the total class investment was zero, payouts were zero to
everyone. After the example chart was explained, subjects were then taken to the actual payout
chart.
While the cooperative outcome to the investment game — everyone investing between $8 and
$10 in the actual chart — results in the highest expected return, the noncooperative solution of
no investment is the dominant strategy for all individuals. This captures the free-riding problem
associated with public goods. Valuation uncertainty is captured by imposing a min, mid, and max
payout range for each investment interval.
Participants in both treatments first completed a survey, which elicited a continuous measure of
their initial WTPs for the actual payout chart. Participants were asked, “As an initial guess, how
much of your $10 do you think you would be willing to invest?” Answers were meant to capture
the participant’s initial WTP from their prior WTP distribution. This survey was then collected
and a second questionnaire was distributed to everyone.
The second questionnaire elicited the participants’ dichotomous investment choices. It asked a
referendum question “Would you be willing to make an investment of $xx?”, where each participant
was given a diﬀerent selected $xx amount from the set of prices {$1, $3, $5, $7, $9}.15

The

referendum in the CT treatment was preceded by the following cheap-talk script:

Before answering the next question please note that in previous runs of this experiment we found that people typically overstate their true willingness to invest by
15

Subjects were informed that not everyone in the group was receiving the same price but were not informed of the
distribution of prices across players. In standard CV surveys, agents are given a randomized announced price but
generally do not inquire about (and thus are not made aware of) the prices other respondents receive. This is because
the cooperative nature of the public good game is not made explicit in field surveys, and because respondents complete
the survey independently of one another, thus precluding the need to provide additional knowledge to respondents.
The provision of this information represents a deviation from CV surveys in practice, but we do not feel that this
alters the fundamental behavioral motives associated with hypothetical bias, cheap talk, and anchoring bias in our
experiments.
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approximately $2.00 when asked to do so in a hypothetical setting like this. Please keep
this in mind when answering the next question.

In each experimental treatment, the referendum was collected, the average class contributions
were calculated, the die was rolled, hypothetical returns were announced and subjects were excused.
The average class contributions in the NCT and CT treatments were $2.32 and $1.67, respectively.
All sessions lasted between 10 and 15 minutes. Three sessions were conducted for each treatment;
20 to 30 subjects attended a session. Instructions are available upon request from the authors.
There was no deception involved in the cheap-talk script, which suggests individuals overestimated their true WTP by $2.00.

Prior to the CT and NCT sessions just described, we ran a

smaller version of the NCT treatment, as well as a treatment where participants made actual investment decisions with the $10. In the actual investment session participants made their referendum
decision, we then collected their investment, rolled the die, calculated returns and paid them as
they left the experiment. Each of the two sessions contained ten economics graduate students and
resulted in an average investment of $2.40 for the NCT session and an average contribution of $0.40
in the actual investment treatment. This diﬀerence established the $2.00 figure in the cheap talk
statement above and provided evidence of positive and robust hypothetical bias.

4

Econometric Analysis

Our primary theoretical result is that anchoring bias and cheap talk interact in a nontrivial manner
— one that makes standard econometric cheap-talk tests appear to be eﬀective for relatively high
announced prices and ineﬀective for relatively low announced prices. In this section, we directly
test this hypothesis using the experimental data. The results support our theory; when the sample
is split by announced prices, cheap talk appears eﬀective for those receiving relatively high prices
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and appears ineﬀective for those receiving relatively low prices.
Selected descriptive statistics for the experimental data are provided in Table 1.

These are

based in part on the demographic surveys completed by subjects. As Table 1 indicates, the average
initial willingness to pay (W T P 0 ) is $3.67, while the average referendum investment amount (τ )
is $4.95 with 48% of respondents saying “yes” to the investment question.

At the bottom of

Table 1 we break down the referendum responses and W T P 0 by referendum investment amounts.
Although the proportion of “Yes” responses tends to fall as the investment amount increases, it
is not uniform.

For example, in moving from a $5 to a $7 referendum price, the proportion of

individuals responding “Yes” to the investment question actually increased.

Notice, however,

that the $7 group had a significantly higher initial WTP, indicating that this group started the
experiment with an increased willingness to invest. This further reinforces the need to consider
announced prices relative to initial WTP. There is also a nearly even split in each treatment,
with 54% receiving cheap talk (CT) and 46% receiving no cheap talk (NCT). Finally, 58% of our
sample received a relatively high announced price (τ > W T P 0 ) while 32% received a relatively low
announced price (τ < W T P 0 ).

4.1

Econometric Methods

As is common in the cheap-talk literature, we specify an empirical model for the (latent) W T Pi1
variable which allows us to estimate a constant cheap-talk and anchoring coeﬃcients16

W T Pi1 = W T Pi0 + ∆Ci + βτ τi +
16

i

(15)

Recall that the cheap-talk meaure ∆i in (13) varies across all agents. Here, we are interested in specifying
an estimable equation with a constant cheap-talk coeﬃcient, ∆, that is similar to that commonly estimated in the
literature and that will enable us to highlight the biases associated with failing to recognize the interaction between
cheap talk and anchoring. Also, note that although ∆i in (13) is defined as the diﬀerence between expected values
(with and without cheap talk) for the same agent, the econometric analysis will contrast the expected WTP of one
set of agents that receive cheap talk (treatment group) with a diﬀerent set of agents that do not receive cheap talk
(control group), holding all other observable factors constant.
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where i = 1, ..., N indexes individual observations, W T Pi0 is a continuous initial measure of WTP,
i

is an i.i.d. normally distributed error term with a zero mean and variance σ 2 , Ci is a dummy

variable set equal to one if the ith agent receives cheap talk and zero otherwise, and ∆ and βτ are
parameters capturing potential cheap-talk and anchoring eﬀects, respectively.17

We then define

the binary variable ACCEP Ti , which equals one if the agent invests at his or her given investment
level τi , and zero otherwise.

As is standard in the literature, we assume that ACCEP Ti = 1

responses imply W T Pi1 > τi and ACCEP Ti = 0 responses imply W T Pi1 ≤ τi .
Next, we define the necessary probabilities for maximum-likelihood estimation. Using (15), the
probability that agent i will accept bid τi is

Pi = Pr[ACCEP Ti = 1]
= Pr[W T Pi1 > τi ]
= Pr[ i > −W T Pi0 − ∆Ci + (1 − βτ )τi ]
µ
¶
1
0
=Φ
[W T Pi + ∆Ci − (1 − βτ )τi ]
σ
for i = 1, ..., N , where Φ is the standard normal cumulative density function.

(16)

A significant

advantage of specifying a model such as (15) with prior WTP as an explanatory variable is that
it allows identification of the fundamental cheap talk and anchoring parameters. The logic here
is similar to that in Cameron and James (1987), but rather than using τi to identify σ , it is
accomplished using the variation in W T Pi0 . Without incorporating W T Pi0 into the determination
of revised WTP, it would not be possible to identify the fundamental anchoring parameter βτ . The
17

As pointed out by an anonymous reviewer, responses to open-ended WTP questions are governed by diﬀerent
incentive compatibility properties than responses to referendum questions. As such, one should exercise caution
when using open-ended questions to guide responses to referendum questions. The extent to which the initial openended question might alter the agent’s response to cheap talk and the subsequent referendum question is an open
and interesting research question.
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associated log likelihood function is

log L =

XN

i=1

{ACCEP Ti ln(Pi ) + (1 − ACCEP Ti ) ln(1 − Pi )} .

(17)

As mentioned in the introduction, the existing cheap-talk literature reports mixed results regarding estimates of ∆.

Some studies have found that cheap talk is eﬀective (i.e., estimates of

∆ are negative and statistically significant), while others have found estimates of ∆ that are statistically indistinguishable from zero or possibly even positive. Based on our theory, estimates of
∆ from equation (15) are likely to be biased because they do not account for the interaction of
anchoring with cheap talk. As highlighted in Regions 1 and 3 of Figure 2, if W T Pi0 < (>)τi we
expect estimates of ∆ will be biased upward (downward) in magnitude.
To explore this possibility, we partition our sample into those who made investment decisions
at relatively low announced prices (LPi = 1 if τi < W T Pi0 ; zero otherwise) and those who made
investment decisions at relatively high announced prices (HPi = 1 if τi > W T Pi0 ; zero otherwise).
We then modify equation (15) allowing for two cheap talk eﬀects — one for relatively low announced
prices and one for relatively high announced prices:

W T Pi1 = W T Pi0 + ∆High (Ci × HPi ) + ∆Low (Ci × LPi ) + βτ τi +

i

(18)

Our theory predicts that the estimate for the high-price individuals (∆High ) will be negative and
of greater magnitude than the estimate for the low-price individuals (∆Low ).

4.2

Econometric Results

We present our econometric results in Table 2. Models 1 and 2 estimate the eﬀect of cheap talk
on WTP using an interval regression model.

An interval regression is simply an ordered probit
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model with fixed and known cut points (Woolridge (2002), page 509). Model 1 does so for the
full sample, while model 2 splits the cheap talk eﬀect into a relatively high-price and low-price
categories.

As discussed above, an important advantage of the specification in equation (18) is

that all the fundamental parameters in Models 1 and 2, including the anchoring parameter, are
identifiable. In fact, there is evidence of statistically significant anchoring, in the neighborhood of
one-third of initial WTP. Turning to the cheap-talk eﬀects, we note that the cheap-talk coeﬃcient
in model 1, while negative, is not statistically diﬀerent than zero. As mentioned in Section 1, this
is consistent with much of the recent cheap-talk literature, which finds that short-scripted cheap
talk is ineﬀective.

Most importantly for this study, in model 2 cheap talk is eﬀective (negative

and statistically significant) for those receiving relatively high announced prices and ineﬀective
(positive and statistically insignificant) for those receiving low announced prices.

These results

support our hypotheses as shown in Regions 1, 2 and 3 of Figure 2, and, as mentioned in Section 1,
are consistent three recent papers in the cheap talk literature — Brown, Azjen and Hrubes (2003);
Murphy, Stevens and Weatherhead (2005) and Cherry and Whitehead (forthcoming).

All three

papers report that cheap talk is eﬀective at relatively high announced prices but ineﬀective at low
announced prices.18

5

DBDC Formats and Incentive Incompatibility

Although the Bayesian-updating process described in Section 2.2 is based on the single-bounded
dichotomous-choice format, our framework naturally extends to multiple-bounded dichotomouschoice formats. For example, in a double-bounded format the agent receives the signal si =
18

We also estimated W T P controlling for the demographic variables elicited on the last page of the experiment
(see Appendix B). The control variables include age, gender, income, college GPA, college rank and degree of risk
aversion. The observed heterogeneity associated with these variables was not capable of explaining the willingness
to invest in the public good. Most of the coeﬃcient estimates associated with the demographic variables were
statistically insignificant and did not qualitatively change the estimates of the anchoring and cheap-talk parameters.
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{ci , τ1i , τ2i } sequentially from the interviewer, where τ1i and τ2i represent the initial and followup announced prices, respectively.

In this case, the agent uses Bayes’ formula twice to update

beliefs regarding the distribution of δi — first using (8) based solely on ci and τ1i , followed by a
revision of beliefs again using (8) but based instead on ci , τ1i and τ2i . The agent then forms sequentially updated expectations of δi using (9).

In a technical appendix, available upon request, we

form a measure of cheap-talk eﬀectiveness similar to that presented in Section 2.2, and distinguish
the cases based on the relative values of the anchoring parameters, W T Pi0 , τ1i and τ2i .
In the context of the double-bounded dichotomous-choice (DBDC) format, the question of incentive incompatibility arises.19 Do the follow-up bids induce a “structural shift” in the agent’s stated
WTP away from the underlying true WTP (in either the positive or negative direction)? Previous
studies laying out the theoretical underpinnings of this question include Alberini, Kanninen and
Carson (1997) and Carson, Groves and Machina (1999). Whitehead (2002) finds empirical evidence
in support of the existence of incentive incompatibility in the double-bounded format. Whitehead
presumes that the agent’s initial WTP represents the true underlying WTP. As a result, any shift
away from initial WTP induced through the iterative bidding process represents perforce incentive
incompatibility. However, for most goods in which CV analysis is applied, agents are unlikely to
know their true WTP with certainty. Recall from (5) that W T Pi0 represents the agent’s perception of the true WTP rather than true WTP itself. Therefore, the shift from W T Pi0 to W T Pi1
represents the agent’s rational updating of the uncertainty associated with what is believed to be
the true WTP. In an environment of uncertainty, it is possible that the follow-up referenda in
DBDC formats provide valuable information for agents who are rationally seeking their true WTP.
19

The early literature on incentive incompatibility in CV studies (Cummings, Elliot, Harrison and Murphy (1997);
Cummings, Harrison and Rutstrom (1995)) appears to characterize incentive incompatibility more broadly than some
of the more recent studies. For example, Cummings, Harrison and Rutstrom (1995) on page 260 state that incentive
compatibility “implies that subjects will answer the CVM’s hypothetical question in the same way as they would
answer an identical question asking for a real committment.” While Whitehead (2002) in a more recent study states
on page 287 that in DBDC formats “if the follow-up questions are not incentive compatible, stated willingness to pay
will be based on true willingness to pay with a shift parameter.”
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Whether this updating brings the agent closer to the true WTP or not depends on the information
contained in the signal.

Once this Bayesian perspective of WTP formation is taken, the recent

discussion of the incentive incompatibility of DBDC formats changes markedly.

6

Summary

In this paper, we develop a Bayesian approach to model the elicitation of WTP for nonmarket
goods and services in the presence of agent uncertainty and noisy signaling.

Agents generally

have limited experience in trying to formulate precise values for the types of public goods typically
examined in CV studies. In these situations, it seems natural to model WTP as being derived from
a Bayesian-updating process rather than from a deterministic process. In a Bayesian framework,
agents begin with a prior distribution over their uncertain WTP and use this distribution to form
an initial WTP estimate.

Agents are then provided with signals from the interviewer such as

announced prices and cheap-talk scripts. This information is used by agents to update their priors
as they “grope” for their true WTP.
One important implication of this process is that, from an econometric standpoint, the signals
interact in such a way as to bias their respective measured eﬀects. As we find in this paper, the
direction and magnitude of the bias in dichotomous-choice formats depends on the distribution
of initial WTPs relative to the opening prices.

Within the context of a CV survey, where the

signals are an announced opening price and cheap talk, we show that if the price is high relative
to an agent’s initial WTP, then standard econometric methods are likely to find a significant or
exacerbated cheap-talk eﬀect. A price that is low relative to an agent’s initial WTP leads to
a measured cheap-talk eﬀect that is mitigated, non-existent, or even counterintuitive.

Because

agents’ initial WTPs are typically unknown in nonmarket valuation studies, it is diﬃcult a priori
to predict the direction and magnitude of the potential bias. We also emphasize that our theory
25

predicts that the bias in measuring the cheap-talk eﬀect depends on the announced price relative
to the respondent’s initial WTP, not simply relative to the average announced price. While these
two measures are likely to be positively correlated, there are also likely to be instances where they
lead one to draw quite diﬀerent conclusions.
We present two sources of information to test our theory.

First, we find that our Bayesian

model is supported in an experimental setting, where we control for external influences.

When

the experimental data are split into relatively high and low announced prices, cheap talk appears
eﬀective for high prices and ineﬀective for low prices. Second, we highlight recent work by Brown
et al. (2003), Murphy et al. (2005), and Cherry and Whitehead (forthcoming) concluding that
cheap-talk eﬀects are weak, but as predicted by our theory it appears eﬀective for those receiving
relatively high announced prices and ineﬀective for those receiving relatively low announced prices.
We interpret this research as being consistent with the interaction between anchoring and cheap
talk in a Bayesian-updating framework. Taken together, neither of the two sets of evidence allow
us to reject our theory. Consequently, our Bayesian interpretation of how agents value public goods
in the presence of uncertainty and noisy signaling is a plausible interpretation of reality.
In light of our findings, what steps might be taken in future empirical research to avoid biasing
the measurement of signals such as cheap talk CV studies? One obvious option is to revert to an
open-ended question format for eliciting WTP so that the issue of anchoring is moot. The referendum format, however, is currently preferred by CV practitioners over the open-ended format and
has the recommendation of the NOAA panel because of its conformity with real market circumstances (Arrow, Solow, Portney, Leamer, Radner and Schuman (1993)). Therefore, assuming the
referendum format remains the preferred approach, we suggest that anchoring to the bid should be
explicitly modeled and accounted for in estimation, as we have shown in this paper.
To follow this approach, and maintain consistency with a Bayesian-updating interpretation, es-
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timates of initial WTP need to be elicited prior to the referendum question. In our CV application,
we have suggested using an open-ended format question to elicit this initial value (reversing the
question order in Green, Jacowitz, Kahneman and McFadden (1998), who ask an initial referendum
question with a follow-up open-ended question), although other question formats may be possible.
As shown in this paper, obtaining information about initial WTP allows for joint identification
of the scaling, cheap talk and anchoring parameters.

This approach stands in stark contrast to

previous research that either does not allow for anchoring (e.g., Cameron and James (1987)) or
treats anchoring as occurring only for the follow-up question in a double-bounded dichotomous
choice framework (e.g., Whitehead (2002)).
Finally, our framework is applicable to more than just CV surveys for public goods. Marketing
questionnaires about WTP for a hypothetical product based on prices of currently sold products are
a close relative to the CV survey. However, any situation where agents are provided information,
either before or during the elicitation of subjective numerical values, or asked to give a yes or no
answer, fits our theoretical setup.

The provided information need not be verifiable or credible.

All that is necessary is that agents think the signal might help them make a better guess. Persons
then rationally update their priors using the new information.
Since WTP in a CV survey is just a statement of preference, it is easy to see how our theory
extends to other types of surveys.

Political opinion polls solicit voter preferences and approval

ratings, for which the yes or no question is frequently preceded by information from the pollster, or
a headline event in the media. There are many surveys that create a consensus forecast or estimate
consumer confidence based on recent past trends or other information. Asking for a forecast or
a feeling of confidence is similar in spirit to asking for WTP. For the most part, all surveys ask
for responses that can be numerically coded for analysis and are seldom answered with perfect
certainty.

In these cases, where agents can receive multiple, sequential signals prior to stating
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their preferences, our theory will help researchers accurately measure the eﬀects of information
signals during the value-elicitation process.
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Appendix A. Derivation of the Bayesian Weighted-Average Updating
Function

Start by considering Bayes’ formula

k(W T P |τ ) ∝ g(τ |W T P )h(W T P )

where ∝ stands for “proportional to” as the marginal distribution for τ is dropped. This is standard
in Bayesian analysis. Now let the conditional and prior distributions be
¸
∙
1
−(τ − W T P )2
=√
exp
g(τ |W T P ) ∼
2σg2
2πσg
¸
∙
1
−(W T P − W T P0 )2
2
.
h(W T P ) ∼ N (W T P0 , σh ) = √
exp
2σh2
2πσh
N (W T P, σg2 )

The posterior distribution is then
¸
∙
(τ − W T P )2 (W T P − W T P0 )2
1
,
exp −
−
k(W T P |τ ) ∝
2πσg σh
2σg2
2σh2
which after expanding the squared terms and dropping constants gives
"

#
W T P 2 (σg2 + σh2 ) + W T P (−2τ σh2 − 2W T P0 σg2 )
k(W T P |τ ) ∝ exp −
.
2σg2 σh2
Finally, we complete the square in W T P to get
⎡ ³
´ ⎤
τ σ 2 +W T P σ2 2
W T P − h σ2 +σ2 0 g
⎥
⎢
g
h
k(W T P |τ ) ∝ exp ⎣−
⎦.
2σ 2 σ2
g h

2
σg2 +σh
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This implies that the mean of the posterior distribution (or the updated WTP value) is
"
#
"
#
τ σh2 + W T P0 σg2
σg2
σh2
=
E(W T P |τ ) =
τ+
W T P0
σg2 + σh2
σg2 + σh2
σg2 + σh2
which if we define α = σh2 /(σg2 + σh2 ), can be written as

W T P1 = ατ + (1 − α)W T P0 .
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Appendix B. Experimental Instructions for NCT and CT Treatments

Instructions
This is an experiment on how people make investment decisions. There are no right or wrong
decisions. You have been given $10 to participate. This is yours to keep. You will not be paid
anything more. Before the experiment begins, an example of how the experiment works is described.
The actual experiment will be conducted after going through this example.
Suppose there are five people, each of whom is given $2 that he or she can invest. The individuals
have made the following decisions:

•
•
•

Person #1 – Invests nothing.
Persons #2 and #3 – Invest $1 each.
Persons #4 and #5 – Invest $2 each.

This results in a total of $6 invested from the five people, for an average investment of $6 ÷ 5 individuals
= $1.20. Using the table below, we can now calculate the return on the investment for each person.
PAYOUT CHART – THIS IS ONLY AN EXAMPLE
Range of Payouts Based on Your Investment Choice
Average
Group
Investment

Greater than $0;
Less than or equal to $1
Greater than $1;
Less than or equal to $2

“YES, I’ll invest”

“NO, I won’t invest”

Min
Payout

Mid
Payout

Max
Payout

Min
Payout

Mid
Payout

Max
Payout

$0

$1

$2

$1

$2

$3

$1

$2

$3

$2

$3

$4

Begin by noting that each person’s payout range is determined in part by his or her investment choice
and the average investment of the group. The average investment of $1.20 falls between $1 and $2 so
we can focus on the second row of numbers in the table. The exact payout is then determined by the
roll of a die. The roll of the die gives equal chances to the Min, Mid and Max payouts. For both the
“YES” and “NO” columns, if a 1 or 2 is rolled the Min is paid; if a 3 or 4 is rolled the Mid is paid; and
if a 5 or 6 is rolled the Max is paid.
For example, assume a “3” is rolled, so the Mid payout occurs. Person #1 invested nothing. The
average group investment was $1.20. Therefore, the person receives a final payout of $3 ($3 payout
less $0 invested). Persons #2 and #3 each invested $1. They receive a payout of $2, and their net
return is $1 ($2 payout less $1 invested). Persons #4 and #5 each invested $2 and also receive a final
payout of $2. Their net return is zero.
Are there any questions before we begin?

ID #

Experiment
Directions. Use the payout chart below to decide whether to hypothetically invest all, part, or none of
your $10. If this experiment were for real, your payout range would determined by your investment
choice and the average investment of the group. (Note that if the total group investment is zero, the
payout is zero to everyone.) The exact payout would be determined by the roll of a die. For both the
YES and NO columns, if a 1 or 2 is rolled the Min is paid; if a 3 or 4 is rolled the Mid is paid; and if a
5 or 6 is rolled the Max is paid.

PAYOUT CHART
Range of Payouts Based on Your Investment Choice
Average
Group
Investment

Greater than $0;
Less than or equal to $2
Greater than $2;
Less than or equal to $4
Greater than $4;
Less than or equal to $6
Greater than $6;
Less than or equal to $8
Greater than $8;
Less than or equal to $10

“YES, I’ll invest”

“NO, I won’t invest”

Min
Payout

Mid
Payout

Max
Payout

Min
Payout

Mid
Payout

Max
Payout

$0

$1

$2

$1

$2

$3

$3

$4

$5

$4

$5

$6

$6

$7

$8

$7

$8

$9

$9

$10

$11

$10

$11

$12

$12

$13

$14

$13

$14

$15

QUESTION #1
As an initial guess, how much of your $10 do you think you'd be willing to invest? ________

ID #

(No Cheap Talk) Experiment (page 2)
The payout chart below is reproduced from the previous page in order to help you answer the following
question.

PAYOUT CHART
Range of Payouts Based on Your Investment Choice
Average
Group
Investment

Greater than $0;
Less than or equal to $2
Greater than $2;
Less than or equal to $4
Greater than $4;
Less than or equal to $6
Greater than $6;
Less than or equal to $8
Greater than $8;
Less than or equal to $10

“YES”, I’ll invest.

“NO”, I won’t invest.

Min
Payout

Mid
Payout

Max
Payout

Min
Payout

Mid
Payout

Max
Payout

$0

$1

$2

$1

$2

$3

$3

$4

$5

$4

$5

$6

$6

$7

$8

$7

$8

$9

$9

$10

$11

$10

$11

$12

$12

$13

$14

$13

$14

$15

QUESTION #2.
This question requires a choice for which you would be hypothetically paid based on
your answer.
Would you be willing to make an investment of xx dollars?

YES
NO

ID #

(Cheap Talk) Experiment (page 2)
The payout chart below is reproduced from the previous page in order to help you answer the following
question.

PAYOUT CHART
Range of Payouts Based on Your Investment Choice
Average
Group
Investment

Greater than $0;
Less than or equal to $2
Greater than $2;
Less than or equal to $4
Greater than $4;
Less than or equal to $6
Greater than $6;
Less than or equal to $8
Greater than $8;
Less than or equal to $10

“YES”, I’ll invest.

“NO”, I won’t invest.

Min
Payout

Mid
Payout

Max
Payout

Min
Payout

Mid
Payout

Max
Payout

$0

$1

$2

$1

$2

$3

$3

$4

$5

$4

$5

$6

$6

$7

$8

$7

$8

$9

$9

$10

$11

$10

$11

$12

$12

$13

$14

$13

$14

$15

Before answering the next question please note that in previous runs of this experiment we found that
people typically overstate their true willingness to invest by approximately $2.00 when asked to do so
in a hypothetical setting like this. Please keep this in mind when answering the next question.

QUESTION #2.
This question requires a choice for which you would be hypothetically paid based on
your answer.
Would you be willing to make an investment of xx dollars?

YES
NO

ID #

Demographic Questions
Please answer the following questions to the best of your ability. These questions are very important
to us. Remember that all information is completely anonymous and confidential.

1. Gender:

Male

Female

2. Age ______
3. Class:

Freshman
Sophomore
Junior
Senior
Graduate

4. Cumulative GPA _________
5. Have you declared a major?
Yes

No

If yes, what is your major? ___________________________________
6. In which range do you think your before-tax annual income falls (income includes wages, salary,
and money from parents but excludes student loans)?
Less than $10,000.
Greater than $10,000 but less than $20,000.
Greater than $20,000 but less than $30,000.
Greater than $30,000.
7. Which would you choose?
$10 with certainty.
50% chance of $0; 50% chance of $20.
I’m indifferent between the two choices above.

Table 1. Variable Names, Definitions and Descriptive Statistics
Variable

Definition

Descriptive Statistics (N = 153)
Mean

SD

Min

Max

Initial WTP

3.67

2.83

0

10

Yes to Investment = 1; No to Investment = 0

0.48

0.50

0

1

τ

Investment Amount

4.95

2.84

1

9

C

Cheap Talk = 1; No Cheap Talk = 0

WTP

0

WTP

1

HP
LP

0.54

0.50

0

1

0

0.58

0.49

0

1

0

0.32

0.47

0

1

Relatively High Price (τ>WTP ) = 1; zero otherwise
Relatively Low Price (τ<WTP ) = 1; zero otherwise

Investment Decision and Initial WTP by Announced Price
Announced Price

Notes. SD = Standard Deviation.

WTP0

WTP1

Mean

N

Mean

N

τ = $1

4.19

32

0.63

32

τ = $3

3.73

30

0.67

30

τ = $5

2.64

30

0.37

30

τ = $7

4.35

32

0.53

32

τ = $9

3.35

29

0.21

29

Table 2. Econometric Results
WTP1 Dependent
(Interval Regression)
Variables
(Estimated Coefficient)

Model #1
Cheap-Talk Effect

Model #2
Partitioned CT Effect

Coefficient

SE

SE

Coefficient

Initial WTP (σε)

6.26***

1.30

7.51***

2.12

Investment Amount (βτ)

0.30**

0.16

0.35**

0.19

Cheap Talk (Δ)

-1.39

1.18

Relatively High Price × Cheap Talk (ΔHigh)

-3.69**

2.28

Relatively Low Price × Cheap Talk (ΔLow )

0.36

2.26

Summary Statistics

Log L = -91.63
N = 153

Notes. SE = Standard Error. CT = Cheap Talk. ** Significant at 5% level. *** Significant at 1% level.

Log L = -90.33
N = 153

Figure 1. Stylized representation of Case 1
Panel A. Cheap Talk
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Panel B. No Cheap Talk
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Figure 2. Relationship between WTP0, τ and Δ
τi
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